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Chapter 5 
 
Weather instruments all at sea: Meteorology and the Royal Navy in the nineteenth 
century 
 
Simon Naylor 
 
Over the last two decades historians and geographers of science have paid increasing 
attention to science in the field. For one, ‘fieldwork has become the ideal type of 
knowledge’, so much so that much work in science studies asks not ‘about temporal 
priorities but about spatial coordination’.1 This agenda has been pursued empirically 
through study of European exploration in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. One 
of the key problematics for historians and geographers has been how, exactly, science 
collaborated with state actors to extend European nations’ ‘spatial grip’. There have 
been three common empirical responses to this question: through the deployment of 
physical observatories; through fieldwork; and by means of ships. Studies of 
observatories – on mountains, on the edge of oceans, in the polar regions – are many, 
as are studies of the ephemeral fieldsite.2 The ship has been seen to embody both of 
these types of scientific space. In his 1845 address to the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science (BAAS), the astronomer John Herschel referred to ships as 
‘itinerant observatories’.3 Naval ships were deemed to be crewed by disciplined 
observers (the equivalent to observatories’ ‘obedient drudges’4), to run according to 
military discipline and were replete with the latest instruments. They were, then, no 
different to terrestrial physical observatories or laboratories, except for their mobility. 
Following Beaglehole, Sorrenson has arguing that ships were more than floating 
2 
laboratories; ships were themselves instruments of geographical discovery – 
conferring authority on their user, leaving traces on maps, and providing ‘superior, 
self-contained, and protected views of the landscapes’ viewed from them.5 
      This chapter engages with debates about the ship as a site of scientific labour 
through an examination of the study of meteorology at sea in the period between the 
conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, and the Conference on Maritime Meteorology, in 
London in 1874. It examines the roles played by individuals and institutions, 
guidebooks and regulations, in promoting a culture of instrumental meteorology 
onboard voyages of exploration, and on Royal Naval and Hydrographic Office survey 
ships.6 Particular attention is paid to attempts to establish international standards for 
the study of meteorology at sea. The chapter illustrates how the British Admiralty was 
supportive of science in the nineteenth century in consenting to its ships being turned 
into floating meteorological observatories. The Admiralty did so to develop 
philosophical inquiry and to respond to more utilitarian concerns. Over the course of 
the nineteenth century an informal, even idiosyncratic, culture of meteorological 
inquiry was gradually formalised; uniform forms and meteorological instruments 
were introduced together with prescribed observations and practices. These, in turn, 
were authorised in Admiralty regulations and guidebooks. Voyages of exploration and 
the Hydrographic Office survey vessels were the experimental sites for this new 
culture, which was expanded to include all Royal Naval vessels, and, later, Britain’s 
merchant marine. 
      Schaffer reminds us that the ‘immutability’ of scientific inscriptions made during 
voyages of exploration ‘was a complicated and exhausting achievement’.7 This was 
true for meteorological inscriptions, whether on a ship’s log board, in a register, or on 
an instrument. In elucidating the adoption, use, and evaluation of meteorological 
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instruments onboard British and other European and American ships, the chapter 
supports Schaffer’s insistence that philosophical instruments existed in various ‘states 
of repair’.8 The term refers to the assumption that the demands of science routinely 
outstripped instruments’ abilities and the humans that interacted with them. While I 
argue that the Admiralty was supportive of science, I also suggest that it was slow and 
conservative over the adoption of a new observational regime and the use of new 
instruments. Despite the adaption of meteorological instruments for life at sea, the 
conduct of sea trials, the issuance of guides to observation and regulations for their 
use, Britain’s naval ships and those of other countries, were by no means itinerant 
observatories.  
      The chapter begins by summarising the changes that affected meteorological 
science and the British Navy in the early nineteenth century. It then examines the role 
of the Royal Society in the organization of several voyages of exploration in the 
1820s and 1830s. It details the role played by Francis Beaufort in the promotion of the 
study of meteorology onboard Royal Naval ships. The final section examines the aims 
and outcomes of two international conferences on maritime meteorology, in Brussels 
in 1853 and London in 1874. 
 
<A>Reforming science and the Navy 
Schaffer’s claim that ‘Managing states of disrepair is salient during scientific 
practices’ periods of dislocation and reorganization, such as the later eighteenth- and 
early nineteenth-century scientific, industrial and political revolutions’, is, I contend, 
applicable to the Admiralty and to meteorological science, in their periods of reform 
in the early nineteenth century.9 The early 1800s witnessed the emergence of natural 
science out of natural philosophy – the development of ‘a comprehensive science (a 
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physics), which associated the separate branches of natural philosophy under a 
dynamic equilibrium model of natural order’.10 Its geographical scope was ambitious: 
to chart the variation of physical and biological features on a global scale.11 The 
physical sciences placed emphasis on data collection during the early nineteenth 
century, with an insistence upon trained observation, developments in written 
recording, and repetition of numerical measurement as a result of an increased 
reliance upon instrumentation’.12 Measurement, quantification and mathematically 
stated laws were upheld as ideals for terrestrial physics general, while the discipline 
of quantification shaped practice.13 
      These reforms are clearly evident in the study of weather. Meteorology moved 
away from what Jankovic has termed the ‘place-centred and curiosity-driven authority 
of meteoric reportage’, to become ‘a constellation of physico-chemical enquiry into 
the nature of atmospheric air and its planetary circulation’. The atmosphere was 
gradually re-conceived as a laboratory and the promotion of its instrumental 
measurement was justified in those terms.14 Meteorology aimed to pursue this agenda 
on a global stage, employing trained observers and calibrated instruments, observing 
at fixed times of day using uniform methods and quantitative systems of notation, 
with a view to laying down ‘the empirical laws of the atmosphere and perhaps extend 
them into a comprehensive meteorological theory’.15 Edwards has suggested that 
meteorologists in the early-to-mid-nineteenth century employed instruments and 
methodical and simultaneous observations to effect a shift from a culture of 
voluntarist internationalism, ‘based on an often temporary confluence of shared 
interests, to quasi-obligatory globalism based on a more permanent shared 
infrastructure’.16 This was vital in studying localities with different weathers – such 
as between temperate northern Europe and its tropical colonies – and in the 
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production of global climate maps, both of which ‘required the fashioning of 
transnational and objective credibility supplied by instruments, standardized registers 
and regular observations’.17 
      The British Admiralty went through a period of reform in the 1810s and 1820s. In 
the aftermath of war with France, the Royal Navy experienced financial retrenchment 
and disarmament: many ships were decommissioned and thousands of enlisted men 
lost their jobs. Naval officers had greater political influence and so few of them were 
retired but perhaps 90 per cent of them found themselves unemployed and on the half 
pay list.18 The First Secretary of the Admiralty, John Wilson Croker, defended the 
reduced Navy Estimates. The Second Secretary of the Admiralty, John Barrow, 
argued that the Navy’s ships and personnel should be employed in global exploration, 
on the basis that ‘exploration would increase scientific knowledge, that it would be a 
boon to national commerce, and above all that it would be a terrible blow to national 
pride if other countries should open up a globe over which Britain ruled supreme’.19 
The Royal Navy and the Admiralty Hydrographic Office made numerous 
contributions to science, including geographical exploration of the Northwest 
Passage, the Antarctic Ocean, and of Africa, such that ‘in the first half of the 
nineteenth century the Navy was the principal governmental subsidizer of science’.20 
For naval officers interested in science, a position on one of these voyages of 
exploration was a choice appointment. These ‘scientific servicemen’ gradually took 
on much of the scientific work from civilians and many became Fellows of the Royal 
Society.21 
 
<A>Cultures of instrumentation on voyages of exploration 
6 
Voyages of exploration in the late 1810s and 1820s served to establish standards for 
the conduct of physical scientific inquiry at sea, particularly in relation to the use of 
philosophical instruments onboard ship. The Royal Society had long offered advice to 
the Admiralty on the scientific aspects of its expeditions, viewed by government and 
the military as a ‘state tool for consultation’.22 The period from Ross’s 1818 Arctic 
voyage to Foster’s South Atlantic expedition in 1828 was a tumultuous one for the 
Society. Joseph Banks’s reign as President of the Royal Society ended with his death 
in 1820. Successive presidents – Humphry Davy (1820-1827) and Davies Gilbert 
(1827-1830) – were caught up in wider contests over the character and direction of 
British science. Davy put the Royal Society on a course that aimed to satisfy both the 
remnants of Banks’s ‘Learned Empire’ and the reformist intentions of the ‘Cambridge 
Network’.23 The changes experienced by the Society over this period were reflected 
in the composition and work of its committees. In the early years of Davy’s 
presidency in particular, increased use was made of scientific committees.24 Over the 
course of the 1820s scientific reformers, such as John Herschel, Charles Babbage and 
Francis Baily, joined long-standing members like Thomas Young, Henry Kater, and 
William Hyde Wollaston, all taking a greater role in the running of these committees. 
Miller notes that members of the reform group ‘increasingly dominated public 
discussion of the most important objects of research for scientific voyages’. 25 
Herschel, in particular, ‘maintained an ambition to make the surveying voyages 
commissioned by Barrow on behalf of the Admiralty more ‘scientific’.26 The changes 
effected in this period had a direct bearing on the advice that the Royal Society 
provided to exploring expeditions. 
      During the final years of Banks’s presidency, William Thomas Brande, one of the 
Royal Society’s two secretaries, wrote to Barrow to supply the Admiralty with a list 
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of instruments that the Society recommended for use on the two 1818 expeditions 
then heading for the polar regions, to be led by John Ross and David Buchan 
respectively. These included compasses, barometers, magnetic instruments, bottom 
sampling and dredging equipment, chronometers, mercurial and sea thermometers, a 
Wollaston micrometer, artificial horizons, electrometers, hydrometers, and apparatus 
‘for ascertaining the quantity of air in water’.27 Four laboratory tents were added to 
protect the instruments during observations to be made onshore, along with two 
transit instruments, four ‘Small Altitude Instruments’, a water sampler, and a tent for 
astronomical observations.28  
      In 1821 a ‘Committee for suggesting Experiments and Observations to Mr Fisher, 
about to proceed to the Arctic Seas under the command of Capt. Parry’ was 
established.29 John Herschel, William Hyde Wollaston, and Charles Hatchett 
bolstered a core group made up of the President, the two secretaries – Brande and 
Taylor Combe – as well as Henry Kater and Thomas Young. The expedition 
astronomer, George Fisher, was invited to attend.30 While the advice given to Ross in 
1818 laid out in detail the instruments to be used on his expedition, that provided to 
Fisher was more direct in the scientific agenda to be pursued, emphasising terrestrial 
physics. Twenty experiments were proposed. The majority focused on the effects of 
extreme cold on atmospheric chemistry, the behaviour of fluids (including mercury), 
and on humans, animals, food, and different metals. Of particular interest was the 
freezing point of pure mercury and of different amalgams of mercury and other 
metals. This was significant because of its effect on the performance of the 
thermometer and barometer.31 Other questions related to the operation and effects of 
the Aurora Borealis, and the investigation of sea temperature at different depths. 
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      The advice supplied to Captain Henry Foster’s 1828 voyage on the HMS 
Chanticleer to the South Atlantic was more comprehensive still. At this committee 
Davies Gilbert (now President), Herschel, and Kater were joined by William Fitton, 
President of the Geological Society of London, Edward Sabine, artillery officer and 
expert in magnetism, and the Admiralty Hydrographer, Francis Beaufort. James 
Horsburgh, the East India Company Hydrographer, and Captains Parry and Foster, 
were present by invitation. In line with the interests of Herschel, Sabine, and 
Beaufort, the principal objects of Foster’s expedition were defined as the investigation 
of physical astronomy, the determination of the figure of the earth, and the 
investigation of the law of the variation of gravity, along with inquiries into ocean 
currents, magnetism, the longitude of significant locations, natural history, and 
meteorology. The Committee noted that meteorological observations ‘form a branch 
of inquiry of no small amount in this and all similar expeditions’ and it recommended 
that ‘regular observations of the Barometer, Thermometer, Hygrometer, and the 
direction and force of the wind should be daily made; and of the actinometer or other 
instruments proper for measuring the Solar and terrestrial variation, at favorable 
opportunities and at various levels’. The result, it was hoped, would be a better 
understanding of ‘the probable former and future climate of different regions of the 
Earth[,] the permanence or variability of the Solar influence at different epochs, and 
the stability of the actual equilibrium of meteorological agents.’32 In its findings, the 
voyage was judged a success and the results were later used by Royal Society 
reformers and members of the Astronomical Society to affirm the analytic importance 
of mathematics in accurate observation and experimental research.33 
       The advice given to Foster was dwarfed, however, by that supplied to James 
Clark Ross for his 1839 voyage to the Antarctic Ocean as part of the magnetic 
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crusade. The committee convened to advise on the expedition was chaired by 
Herschel and included Beaufort, Sabine, John Ross, Michael Faraday, John Frederic 
Daniell, Peter Mark Roget, Charles Wheatstone, and William Snow Harris.34 The 
expedition was principally intended as an investigation into terrestrial magnetism, but 
other sciences were pursued, including study of the tides, the figure of the earth, and 
meteorology. Meteorology was given greater emphasis than was necessary simply to 
correct the performance of the magnetic instruments.35 The committee additionally 
advised on the instruments with which the naval expedition should be equipped. In 
terms of meteorology, these included actinometers, Lind’s rain gauge, an Osler 
anemometer, and spirit thermometers for operation in Antarctic temperatures below 
those at which mercury freezes and mercurial thermometers became ineffective.36 
Procedures were recommended for the verification of the instruments, especially 
when the expedition was far from fixed observatories on land.37 Both of the ships – 
HMS Erebus and HMS Terror – were to carry standard barometers and thermometers 
against which others were to be compared. This was especially important when 
instruments were taken ashore, ‘so as to detect and take into account of any change 
which may have occurred in the interval’.38 The standards on one ship were to act as 
checks upon the other. 
       The passage of the Erebus and Terror from the tropics to the Antarctic presented 
an opportunity to investigate von Humboldt’s claim that atmospheric pressure at the 
equator was uniformly ‘less in its mean amount than that at and beyond the tropics’, a 
phenomena that was, in turn, believed to produce the trade winds.39 The observation 
of changes in the barometer when approaching the line was therefore of great 
scientific value, as was the observation of the local effects that continents or oceanic 
currents had on atmospheric pressure. Periods spent at high southern latitudes also 
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presented opportunities to calibrate the instruments. For instance, Ross was asked to 
verify and to register the ships’ standard thermometers at the freezing point of 
mercury whenever the opportunity arose. This was to be effected by placing four 
permanent marks on the tube of each standard thermometer, and Ross was ‘requested 
occasionally to compare these marks with the degrees of the ivory scale’. A bottle of 
mercury was ordered to accompany each standard thermometer.40 
      The scientific instructions presented to Ross contained, in Ross’s words, ‘a 
detailed account of every object of inquiry which the diligence and science of the 
several committees of that learned body could devise’.41 This report became a 
standard for subsequent scientific guides. Ward and Dowdeswell note that the 
Admiralty’s 1849 Manual of Scientific Enquiry was effectively a reworking of the 
1839 report, prefaced and edited by Herschel.42 
       The deployment of philosophical instruments, and the supply of precise 
instructions for observations and experiments was not alone enough, however, to 
guarantee reliable inscriptions. The directions provided to the captains of scientific 
expeditions were often aspirational in tone and susceptible to compromise when in the 
field. The robustness of the scientific outcomes of an expedition relied as much on 
‘immense chains of delegated trust and labour’ as they did on detailed instructions, 
calibrated instruments and well organised skeleton forms.43 Instruments could not 
speak for themselves effectively. The determination of their accuracy relied on the 
person or persons operating them. Identifying and justifying who was to operate 
which instruments was a crucial matter in voyages of exploration. For John Ross’s 
1818 voyage to the Arctic, the Royal Society committee suggested to the Admiralty 
that Sabine was the ‘proper person to conduct certain experiments’, accompanied by a 
Sergeant of Artillery to ‘take care of instruments’.44 The Committee also suggested 
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the inclusion of Fisher – ‘a Gentleman of considerable mathematical talent’ – while 
Henry Kater reported that the naval officers John Franklin, Frederick Beechey, and 
William Parry ‘had been most assiduous in acquiring a due knowledge of the use of 
the Instruments to be employed in the Northern Expedition, and that he considers 
them fully competent to prosecute the required observations and experiments’.45 
       Despite the various controversies surrounding Ross’s 1818 Arctic expedition, the 
Royal Society again recommended Sabine as a member of William Parry’s 1819 
Arctic voyage: 
It is of the opinion of this Committee that Capt’n Sabine has shown the 
greatest possible diligence in making the observations which were intrusted 
[sic] to his care and the greatest judgement and regularity in his method of 
recording them. And this Committee therefore suggests the propriety of 
recommending Capt’n Sabine to the Admiralty in the strongest manner, both 
as deserving every professional encouragement, and as a proper person to be 
again appointed to take charge of the Observations to be made in a new 
Expedition.46 
The reiteration of instrumental and observational competence was crucial. The 
practices employed and the vagaries of the instruments’ fate ‘governed the status of 
the data they produced and the interpretations they suggested.’47 The reputation of the 
observer was intrinsically linked to the data and the instruments: ‘To question or 
doubt results or methodology was to question the character and morality of their 
creator’.48 
 
<A>Reforming meteorology 
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After 1820, Royal Society committee members were increasingly chosen on the basis 
of expertise, whether intellectual or professional. This was also true in other respects, 
such as over the quality and use of the Society’s meteorological instruments. The 
committee formed in 1822 to study this matter incorporated Thomas Young, William 
Hyde Wollaston and Henry Kater, together with Humphry Davy, Davies Gilbert, the 
secretaries Brande and Combe, Babbage, Herschel, as well as Luke Howard and John 
Frederic Daniell, included given their standing in meteorology and related fields.49 
Amongst other recommendations, the Committee ordered the construction of new 
instruments for the Society, including two barometers from John Newman, of Lisle 
Street, London; these were, subsequently, the subject of experiments at the Society in 
December 1822.50 The observational regime and the siting of the Society’s 
instruments were also reviewed. At a meeting of the Society’s Meteorological 
Committee in 1827, the astronomers and reformers James South and Francis Baily, 
along with Beaufort and Herschel, complained over recording forms and the quality 
and situation of its meteorological instruments. They argued that the ‘local situation’ 
of its headquarters at Somerset House did not allow for the production of ‘any series 
of meteorological observations of material weight and importance in the present state 
of the science’.51 
       For Jankovic, ‘Whether fairly or not, early nineteenth-century commentators … 
erupted with criticisms of a general lethargy that supposedly prevailed in the 
investigation of weather-systems, of the insufficiency and profusion of observations, 
of the public uselessness of the existing stock of facts, and of the imprecision of 
means for standardizing and using meteorological instruments.52 In his 
Meteorological Essays, John Daniell, Professor of Chemistry at Kings College, 
London, pointed to the Royal Society’s meteorological observations as evidence of 
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the poor science undertaken in England. He extended his criticism to the operations of 
overseas observatories, where, he claimed, there had been insufficient coordination of 
efforts, such that their ‘labour and perseverance lose more than half their value by the 
want of a well-digested plan of mutual co-operation’.53 Concerns about the level of 
training and expertise of meteorological observers similarly preoccupied James 
Forbes and William Whewell, who argued that science should centre on precision 
observations and be conducted by trained personnel. Forbes expressed these 
arguments in his 1832 report on British meteorology to the BAAS meeting in Oxford. 
For Forbes, meteorological instruments ‘have been for the most part treated like toys’, 
while few of the numerous registers ‘which monthly, quarterly, and annually are 
thrown upon the world’ could be expected to afford information useful to the 
development of the science.54 The situation was, in his view, so bad as to require ‘a 
total revision upon which meteorologists have hitherto very generally proceeded’.55  
       This troubled history of meteorology at the Royal Society is important given 
discussions over the deployment of meteorological instruments on Admiralty ships. 
The review of the Royal Society’s own instrumental practices was coincident with the 
Society’s advice to captains and scientific officers onboard exploring expeditions. The 
composition of the Society’s committees on these issues was almost identical. It is 
reasonable to assume, therefore, that the reform of meteorology at the heart of British 
science was part of attempts to improve the conduct of science at sea. The difficulties 
experienced at the Royal Society illustrate the difficulties inherent in the pursuit of an 
exacting instrumental regime. The committees established to advise Parry, Foster and 
others laid down scientific agendas and observational practices on the assumption that 
ships were floating observatories. At the same time, criticisms of the Society’s own 
meteorological practices illustrated the challenges of meeting such demands when on 
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dry land. When far away from instrument makers and scientific advisers, onboard a 
moving ship in challenging conditions, operating personnel had no choice but to 
‘make up and mend ways of recording and transmitting what they reckoned worth 
noting’.56 
 
<A>Francis Beaufort and instrumental cultures on hydrographic ships 
Scientific and exploring expeditions, such as those discussed above, helped establish 
precedents for the collection of information about terrestrial physics onboard ships. 
The success of these and other voyages in the first half of the nineteenth century 
encouraged the belief that military vessels might be employed as floating 
observatories. In his work on French arctic expeditions, Locher notes that the regular 
maintenance of the systematic naval watch offered real advantages to science, 
particularly if officers could be compelled to collect data in addition to the other 
observations they were required to undertake.57 Naval officers received training in 
mathematics, navigation and astronomy and would have been comfortable operating 
relatively sophisticated precision instruments. For observations to be scientifically 
useful, however, they had to be made regularly, specific instruments had to be 
employed and full details had to be supplied about their constitution and conditions of 
use. Particular reduction protocols and computing methods had to be followed. The 
situation of an instrument and the state of the atmosphere around it had to be given 
consideration and recorded so that measurements could be reduced to a virtual 
common environment. The man who spent much of his career persuading the 
Admiralty to adopt these procedures in the observation of the weather onboard naval 
ships was Francis Beaufort (1774-1857). 
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      Beaufort began his naval career on an East India Company ship. He served in the 
Royal Navy in the Napoleonic Wars, reaching the rank of Captain in 1810. In 1829 he 
was appointed Admiralty Hydrographer of the Navy, a position he held until 1855. 
Beaufort has been credited with turning the Hydrographic Office into a world-leader 
in maritime survey.58 He also played an active role in the administration and 
advancement of science in Britain. From 1831, he was head of the scientific branch of 
the Admiralty Board. He spent much of his career promoting the adoption of his wind 
scale and a system of weather notation onboard hydrographic, naval, merchant and 
packet ships, and in encouraging the proper use of barometers and thermometers at 
sea. 
      As Admiralty Hydrographer, Beaufort was in a position to promote his 
meteorological agenda amongst officers on the Royal Navy’s surveying ships. His 
influence is evident in the instructions provided in 1831 to Captain Robert Fitzroy for 
the latter’s hydrographic survey of the South American coastline. Beaufort ordered 
Fitzroy to keep a ‘steadily and accurately kept’ meteorological register in which the 
wind and weather should be observed using Beaufort’s own notations. Barometer 
readings were to be kept and entered into the register, at 9 am and 4 pm. Temperature 
readings were to be taken at the same times and the extremes of the self-registering 
thermometer were to be noted daily. The temperature of the sea at the surface was to 
be taken and compared to that of the air.59 Beaufort cautioned Fitzroy that no 
reflected heat should act on the instruments. This was a challenge onboard a ship at 
night, the more so given the generally warm atmosphere surrounding the vessel.60 
      These duties were extended to other surveying vessels, but Beaufort struggled to 
ensure that they were met. The log books from various hydrographic surveys during 
the 1830s demonstrated that what was observed, and when, varied from ship to ship. 
16 
Beaufort expressed his frustration at the rather haphazard adoption of his 
meteorological standards in surveying instructions provided to Lieutenant Edward 
Barnett in 1837, about to take command of HMS Thunder. Beaufort justified the use 
of the barometer and thermometer on the grounds that they would ‘provide authentic 
data collected from all parts of the world’, and aid ‘future labourers’. He conceded, 
however, that those hours of entry ‘greatly interfere with the employments of such 
officers as are capable of registering those Instruments with the precision and delicacy 
which alone can render meteorologic data useful’.61 Given that meteorological data’s 
future utility was so uncertain, Beaufort suggested that Barnett should do no more 
than to record the height of the barometer twice a day, along with the extremes of the 
thermometer. 
      Frustrated by the slow pace of change, Beaufort and his assistant, Alexander 
Bridport Becher, mounted a campaign in the late 1830s to persuade the Admiralty to 
impose a uniform meteorological culture on its ships. Becher was chief Naval 
Assistant in the Hydrographic Office.62. In 1838 he wrote a strongly worded 
memorandum on the subject. As well as urging officers to make use of the log book to 
record wind and weather as suggested by Beaufort, Becher noted that ‘no seaman in 
command of a ship ever thinks of going to sea without a barometer or 
sympiesometer’. Becher pointed to the ‘great advantage that would arise from the 
observations of it being recorded in every weather, not to mention during extreme 
events such as storms and hurricanes, when ‘changes in its height during their 
progress and times of change should be carefully noted’.63 Beaufort also urged 
officers to use the ship’s logboard to record the height of the barometer and the 
thermometer at least once in every watch, suggesting that additional columns be 
added for this purpose. 
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      The apparent inability of the Admiralty to enforce the meteorological suggestions 
of its Hydrographer encouraged Beaufort to make use of the Royal Society. He was 
aided in this by Lieutenant-Colonel William Reid, a Royal Engineer. Reid’s interest 
in meteorology stemmed from his employment as  Resident Engineer on Barbados, 
and centred particularly on Atlantic hurricanes. He published a book on this, An 
Attempt to Develop the Law of Storms, in 1838, which the Admiralty ordered to be 
supplied to naval officers. In January 1839 Reid wrote to John Herschel, then Chair of 
the Royal Society’s Meteorological Committee, forwarding a letter from Lord 
Glenelg (Secretary of State for War and the Colonies). The letter announced the 
intention of the Admiralty to make additions to the log books of naval ships, including 
columns for observations of the height of the thermometer and barometer.64 
      Courtney claims that it was the Royal Society’s intervention that led to the formal 
issue of marine barometers to the naval fleet in 1843, a matter administered through 
the Hydrographic Office.65 This development was reflected in the 1844 edition of the 
Admiralty Instructions, where captains were told to have the barometer ‘carefully 
suspended in some secure and accessible part of the Ship’ (and to note its location at 
the beginning of the log book), and to make observations at 6 am, noon, 6 pm, and 
midnight.66 The BAAS was quick to utilise this new development. In 1845, survey 
ships on the Home Station were ordered to assist the Association, which was 
interested in observing meteorological phenomena that affected the British Isles 
during the autumn. Officers were asked to keep registers of barometric observations 
during October and November using printed directions and blank forms issued 
especially, and were required to again do so in 1846.67 
      Interest in the value of meteorological instruments at sea spread beyond the 
survey fleet. In February 1847 Beaufort received a letter from Sir Henry John Leeke, 
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flag-captain of HMS Queen, a 110-gun first-rate ship of the line and the last sailing 
battleship to be completed before the widespread introduction of steam power.68 
Leeke wrote to Beaufort to promote the work of his Major of Marines, David M. 
Adam, whose knowledge of the barometer and attention to changes in the weather had 
been of ‘great use’ to him onboard. Adam was ‘half a very clever scientific man’, 
claimed Leeke, and he requested additional meteorological instruments to aid 
Adam.69 Attached to Leeke’s letter was one from Adam himself, addressed to Leeke 
although presumably targeted at Beaufort, forwarding his readings of the barometer, 
thermometer, wind direction and force, and weather while HMS Queen was at 
Plymouth Sound in November and December 1846. Adam requested a hygrometer, 
anemometer, rain gauge, electrometer, and dipping circle, on the grounds that ‘If there 
is one place where accurate knowledge of [the weather], is more useful than another, 
that place is a Man of War – on ship-board.’ For Adam, instruments ‘may give the 
young officers a scientific turn’, and that the serious study of meteorology on a 
flagship could only lead to ‘a more accurate knowledge of that science’ throughout 
the fleet.70 He promised the Admiralty Lords weekly or monthly meteorological 
reports in return. 
      Even with these and other developments, Beaufort remained dissatisfied with the 
scope and quality of meteorological work in the naval and merchant fleets.71 Writing 
to the Admiralty in June 1852, Beaufort argued that naval officers were still not 
‘imbued with a sense of [meteorology’s] importance', despite the ease with which a 
meteorological culture could be engendered: 
The mere record of the Air, & of the Sea at different depths – the force & 
direction of the winds – the set of the currents – the fluctuations of the 
Barometer &c. &c. would be easily procured as they would give but little 
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trouble & require but little skill – & after a little time when the officers 
became familiar with the instruments & warmed to the undertaking, the nicer 
observations on the state of the atmosphere, the quantity of rain, the 
indications of changes in the wind & weather, and minute descriptions of 
mutual phenomena would be duly registered according to the forms which 
might be prescribed in what might be called a supplementary log.72 
Beaufort again turned to the Royal Society, hoping that it could provide a skeleton 
form, a list of instruments and duplicates to go to each vessel, advice on who should 
build them, and 'by whom compared & verified.' He also hoped that the Admiralty 
and the Board of Trade might persuade the directors of mail packet companies and 
merchant ships respectively to entice their crews to do something similar. 
 
<A>The Brussels and London Maritime Conferences 
In 1853 a maritime conference was convened to establish a uniform international 
system of meteorological observation at sea, its justification being the improvements 
that could be made to navigation and scientific knowledge.73 Although the idea for 
the conference came from William Reid and his former commanding officer, Sir John 
Fox Burgoyne, it was organised by the US Government and held in Belgium, chaired 
by the astronomer Adolphe Quetelet. The British delegates were Captain Henry James 
of the Ordnance Survey and Captain Frederick Beechey, head of the Marine 
Department of the Board of Trade. The principal aim of the conference was to design 
a meteorological register for use on naval and, if possible, merchant ships. Delegates 
were wary of extending the conference remit, although discussion strayed inevitably 
onto instrumentation. Beechey argued that it was impossible to recommend the 
adoption of any particular instruments, let alone any specific instrument makers, 
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given that different scales and standards were in use internationally; and that any 
standardization of instruments would ‘interfere too abruptly with long established 
usages and long established records, with which the observations now to be collected 
would require a reduction, before they could be compared’.74 
      Despite a general reluctance to standardise instruments and instrumental cultures, 
there was some debate over the use of the thermometer and barometer at sea. 
Delegates recommended that ships should carry both, along with ‘at least one good 
chronometer, one good sextant, [and] two good compasses’. The conference 
acknowledged the widespread use of barometers onboard seagoing vessels of all types 
and their value as indicators of changes in relative pressure, but their use as recorders 
of absolute pressure was lamented: ‘That an instrument so rude and so abundant in 
error, as is the marine barometer generally in use, should in this age of invention and 
improvement be found on board any ship, will doubtless be regarded hereafter with 
surprise’.75 
      Similar sentiments were expressed of the thermometer. The conference noted that 
too many were in use at sea despite users having no idea of their degree of error, 
which rendered the results worthless. The French delegate, Alexandre Delamarche, 
argued that a uniform thermometer should be adopted internationally, but, as for the 
barometer, he acknowledged the difficulty of introducing a single universal design. It 
was, nevertheless, agreed that the centigrade scale should be added to all 
thermometers (although not to the thermometer attached to the barometer), alongside 
any other scale currently in use. This was justified on the grounds of the possible 
future adoption of the centigrade scale – ‘to accustom observers in all services to its 
use’ – rather than its immediate use; the conference rejected the proposal that a 
separate centigrade column should be added to the meteorological register.76 
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       The immediate consequences of the conference were positive, at least as far as 
the British contingent was concerned. Beechey reported on the outcomes of the 
conference to the British government and, in February 1854, the First Lord of the 
Admiralty, Sir James Graham, announced in the House of Commons that a new 
government department was to be formed, called the Meteorological Department, to 
be funded through the Board of Trade and the Admiralty. Its aims were to effect the 
recommendations of the conference: to collect and analyse meteorological 
observations taken at sea; to promote the observation of the weather onboard ships; 
and, in the spirit of international cooperation, to convey reduced observations to the 
US Naval Observatory.77 This Department, led by Robert Fitzroy, began to supply 
instruments, instructions and registers to Royal Navy ships and British merchantmen, 
and to collect and compile weather logs. The Department was not long in attracting 
criticism, notably from Francis Galton, the African explorer, meteorologist and 
eugenicist, who took issue with FitzRoy’s attempts at weather forecasting.78 The 
workload and criticism took its toll on FitzRoy, who committed suicide on Sunday 30 
April 1865. The committee of inquiry formed to consider the Department’s work in 
the aftermath of FitzRoy’s death was chaired by Galton and identified several 
shortfalls and proposed some suggestions for improvement. While Galton’s Report 
complimented the Department on overseeing the provision of ships with instruments 
and registers, it was felt that too few registers had been collected and that there was 
insufficient global coverage.79 
      There were several attempts to develop trans-national networks of meteorological 
observations and stations in the 1860s, but these proved unsuccessful, due in part to 
the unstable political situation in Europe.80 Several conferences on the topic were 
eventually convened in the 1870s. The first was held in Leipzig in 1872, followed by 
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an international congress in Vienna in 1873. In 1874 a private conference on maritime 
meteorology was held in London. The London conference set out to review 
participating nations’ implementation of the recommendations of the 1853 Brussels 
conference, and to promote the recommendations of the 1872 and 1873 meetings; 
namely, that ‘Thorough uniformity in methods and instruments should be aimed at’; 
‘Unity of measures and scales is desirable, and to this end the introduction of 
millimètres for the barometer and the Centigrade scale for the thermometer should be 
aimed at’; and that ‘the importance of the co-operation of the Navies’ should be 
promoted.81 In its aims the conference was part of wider movements in the 1870s to 
establish international standards, such as the international gold standard and the 
Treaty of the Metre.82 
       Participants’ responses revealed differences of opinion on the aims and successes 
of the 1853 conference and over subsequent attempts to introduce a uniform 
international approach to the study of meteorology at sea. Brigadier-General Myer, 
Chief Signal Officer in the US Army, reported that the USA had followed the 
Brussels plan. J.C. de Brito-Capello, the Director of the Nautical and Meteorological 
Observations at the Lisbon Observator. The Danish were also supportive, although 
Captain Hoffmeyer of the Danish Royal Meteorological Institute conceded that some 
compromises had been made, such as the use of aneroid barometers on smaller 
vessels where a mercurial barometer ‘cannot appropriately be placed’. 
       Other nations were less positive. Professor Buys Ballot, the Dutch meteorologist 
and the meeting’s President, argued that the Brussels conference had ‘asked for too 
many observations’ and that the hours of observation were inconvenient. The French 
made similar complaints. The report of Captain Rikatcheff of the Imperial Russian 
Navy was perhaps the most pessimistic. The thermometers used onboard Russian 
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vessels had continued to use the Reaumur scale, without the recommended addition of 
the centigrade scale, because of worries that ‘one would often be read instead of the 
other’. The barometers had not been compared since 1853 and the necessary 
corrections not been determined, due to the want of a dedicated office to do so. 
Rikatcheff complained that meteorological observations obtained at sea were not 
discussed or utilized in his country, or shared with other countries. For Rikatcheff, 
‘You ought not to be astonished, Sir, if from these answers you see that the greater 
part of our Maritime Meteorological Observations lie dormant till now.’83 
      Discussion of the various recommendations made at the 1874 conference was 
similarly wide-ranging and conflicting. Disagreements remained over which scales to 
use when measuring temperature; to what degree of accuracy readings should be 
taken; what scale should be used to record wind force; how the labour of global 
meteorological study should be divided; what form the meteorological register should 
take; and how the resultant data should be dealt with, analysed and archived. The 
various formal conference resolutions reflected these differences.84 Attempts to 
fashion a unifying, international language of science, which would allow 
meteorologists of all nations to communicate with one another, was part of a wider 
effort to effect a system of liberal internationalism in the 1870s; to foster economic 
and social progress; and popularize a language of progress. As with concurrent 
attempts to encourage the universal adoption of the metric system, however, the 
implementation of a single international system of marine meteorology was stymied 
by national rivalries and resistance to new measures and practices onboard the ships 
of the various European navies.  
 
<A>Conclusion 
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This chapter has shown that during the nineteenth century Britain’s Admiralty 
gradually adopted and honed the practice of observing and recording the weather 
onboard its ships. The polar expeditions of the 1810s and 1820s served as important 
test sites for the development of new observation protocols, registers and instrumental 
practices, which, in turn, were informed by scientific reforms then taking place. These 
practices were then introduced more widely, initially to the Hydrographic Office’s 
survey ships and then to the naval fleet.  
      The implementation of a universal schedule of observations and the correct siting 
and use of various instruments onboard surveying and fighting ships was not easily 
achieved. Beaufort and others struggled to persuade the Admiralty of the value of 
systematic meteorological observations on its ships. Getting officers to conform to 
protocols once they were laid down remained a challenge, especially on ships whose 
main purpose was not scientific or hydrographic. Observations were made at irregular 
times of the day and instruments were sited inappropriately. Observers failed to check 
instruments against standards, entered readings into the registers retrospectively and 
made erroneous reductions. Attempts in the later nineteenth century to institute a 
single meteorological culture across European navies further exposed the highly 
localized nature of a supposedly universal science. 
      It is not, then, straightforwardly possible to conceive of British naval and 
surveying vessels as itinerant observatories, if, that is, we assume the observatory to 
have been an uncompromised site for science and its observers obedient drudges. The 
evidence examined here makes it difficult to agree entirely with Edward’s claim that 
mid-nineteenth-century meteorology conformed to or was productive of a quasi-
obligatory globalism. Scientific manuals and conference proceedings give the 
impression of international consensus, but closer reading reveals differences over 
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issues of instrument type, the scales to use, when and how to observe, and so on. All 
that said, if we assume that observatories and their instruments always existed in 
various states of repair and that observational practices internal to them were always 
liable to compromise and dissent, and if we proceed on the basis that international 
scientific networks were always performative and subject to translation, then it does 
become possible to include the man-of-war and its various barometers, thermometers 
and log books as critical components in the extension of European power over space. 
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